More or Less Conscious
I posted about Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and how it strongly violates some of our intuitions about things that are conscious, and whether we can try to formalize those intuitions.…
I posted about Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and how it strongly violates some of our intuitions about things that are conscious, and whether we can try to formalize those intuitions.…
I think John Searle is largely right in his skepticism about strong A.I. -- as I describe here, here, and here in the context of the Chinese Room argument --…
I've written about the Chinese Room a couple of times now. In an initial post, I gave a basic overview and discussed the Systems Reply. In a follow-up, I talked…
Recently we talked about the Chinese Room argument. One of the aims of the argument is to show that strong A.I. (A.I. that has understanding or consciousness) is impossible. It's…
If we want to speculate about whether an A.I. system could be conscious, we first need to specify which type of consciousness we mean. There is more than one type,…
Two years ago, I wrote a paper called "Stoic Ethics for Artificial Agents" that was presented at Canadian A.I. It is a somewhat unusual paper, and argues for considering virtue…
I wanted one of my first posts to be about the Chinese Room thought experiment, as it combines my interests in language, A.I., and consciousness. In this post, I'll lay…
My name is Gabriel, and I work in the areas of language, computing, and artificial intelligence. I also have a strong interest in consciousness and philosophy of mind, and this…