I posted about Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and how it strongly violates some of our intuitions about things that are conscious, and whether we can try to formalize those intuitions.…
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a theory that says consciousness is a property of systems with integrated information, and that we can (in theory) measure how much consciousness a system…
I think John Searle is largely right in his skepticism about strong A.I. -- as I describe here, here, and here in the context of the Chinese Room argument --…
Any neuroscientific explanation of consciousness is going to run up against the hard problem of consciousness. Take Global Workspace theories for example. Here is one such version by Dehaene and…
Has Daniel Dennett ever directly addressed this apparent contradiction in his views? He believes that people who think philosophical zombies are conceivable are mistaken. See, for example, his discussion of…
In this post, I want to combine two things that I recently wrote about: I wrote that one of the challenges facing illusionist views of consciousness is the experiencer problem:…
I came across this Twitter thread from earlier this Summer, after I had read Keith Frankish's article on Illusionism. Follow the thread down from here: https://twitter.com/murraygabriel/status/1148786759553019904 It reminded me that…
Modern science struggles to make sense of consciousness. What would a coherent materialist / physicalist model of phenomenal consciousness look like? How can our current scientific methods explain how we…
The phenomenon of blindsight is astonishing, and seems to have major implications for consciousness. In this post, I'll base a lot of the discusion on the book Blindsight and the…
I've written about the Chinese Room a couple of times now. In an initial post, I gave a basic overview and discussed the Systems Reply. In a follow-up, I talked…
